Saint Louis University Public Law Review
Volume 21
Number 1 The Jury's Role in Administering
Justice in the United States (Volume XXI, No. 1)

Article 13

2002

Lofton v. Kearney: Discrimination Declared Constitutional in
Florida
Carolyn S. Grigsby

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Grigsby, Carolyn S. (2002) "Lofton v. Kearney: Discrimination Declared Constitutional in Florida," Saint
Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 21 : No. 1 , Article 13.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LOFTON v. KEARNEY: DISCRIMINATION DECLARED
CONSTITUTIONAL IN FLORIDA

Although many homosexuals desire to adopt children, even hard-to-place
children, society does not afford them the same opportunity to adopt enjoyed
by heterosexuals.1 Why does such a disparity exist? Many courts assert that
homosexual adoption is inappropriate because homosexuals are unfit parents
and such placement is against a child’s best interest.2 Courts fall victim to
various misconceptions surrounding homosexuality. Some of these mistaken
beliefs are that homosexuals are more likely to molest their children than
heterosexuals, children of homosexuals will themselves grow up to be
homosexuals, homosexuals will be unable to teach their children “appropriate
gender roles,” children of homosexuals will be exposed to the AIDS virus and
children of homosexuals will be teased and tormented by society.3 Empirical
studies show that these beliefs are generally untrue.4 By relying on
stereotyping and misconceptions, courts are using the long-standing “best
interest of the child” standard (hereinafter BIOC) to discriminate against
individuals based on their sexual orientation. The sad ending is that both

1. David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests?, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 31 (1993) (noting the disparity between homosexual and heterosexual adoptions); see
also Timothy E. Lin, Note, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of
Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 769-71 (1999) (discussing
hard-to-place children and how these “undesirable” kids are left to be adopted by non-traditional
parents).
2. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382-83 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (upholding a
categorical ban on homosexual adoptions based on the belief that it is in the best interest of
Florida’s children); see also Mark E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and
Mis-Use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 207, 211 (1995).
3. Mark Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting,
Adoption, and the Best Interest of the Child, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 49, 69-85 (1996) (discussing the
misconception that homosexuals are unfit parents because they are likely to molest their children,
their children are likely to become gay, the inability of homosexuals to teach appropriate sex
roles, the fear that their children will be more likely to acquire the AIDS virus, their children will
face teasing, as well as morality concerns); see also Lin, supra note 1, at 778 (discussing the
influence of false narratives on homosexuals regarding adoption rights).
4. Charlotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Resource for Psychologists,
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/parent.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2001) (discussing research
findings regarding children of homosexuals). See generally Marianne T. O’Toole, Note, Gay
Parenting: Myths and Realities, 9 PACE L. REV. 129, 144-48 (1989).
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special needs children and homosexuals are denied the opportunity to be a part
of a family.5
I. INTRODUCTION
Although homosexual adoptions are exceedingly more difficult to
accomplish than heterosexual adoptions in every jurisdiction across the nation,
in the case of Lofton v. Kearney6 United States District Court Judge James
Lawrence King left America’s toughest legal prohibition intact.7 In a 2001
decision the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida set the
nation back by upholding the constitutionality of a statutory ban on
homosexual adoptions.8 In doing so, the court used the BIOC as a pretext for
discrimination.9 The outcome of this decision is harmful; the state of Florida
has lost track of reality. The reality is that there are five hundred thousand
children in foster care across the nation.10 One hundred thousand of these
children are awaiting adoption and most of them will never be adopted.11 In
1997, there were only “qualified” parents for twenty-percent of these
children.12 The remaining eighty-percent continued in foster care years longer
than intended. Children even less fortunate are reduced to spending their entire
childhoods in institutions and residential facilities and being released at the age
of majority to pursue a life on their own.13 These children will never know
what it is to belong to a family.
Even if homosexuals were afforded the right to adopt children nationwide,
there would not be enough homes for these hundreds of thousands of family-

5. Elovitz, supra note 2, at 210; Heather J. Langemak, Comment, The “Best Interest of the
Child”: Is a Categorical Ban on Homosexual Adoption an Appropriate Means to This End? “To
Be Happy at Home is the Ultimate Result of All Ambition, the End to Which Every Enterprise and
Labour Tends, and of Which Every Desire Prompts the Prosecution,” 83 MARQ. L. REV. 825,
834-35 (2000); see also Strasser, supra note 3, at 49 (stating “[s]tates may limit the ability of
lesbian and gay couples to adopt children . . . . These preclusions have been alleged to further the
important state interest of promoting the best interest of the child. Empirical evidence supports
the opposite conclusion.”).
6. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
7. Id. at 1385.
8. Id. at 1374 (holding that Florida Statute 63.042(3) is constitutional). This statute is
known as the “homosexual adoption provision” and it prohibits adoptions by homosexuals with
the language, “No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is
homosexual.” Homosexuality is not a mere factor in the adoption consideration, it is a per se ban.
9. Id. at 1383.
10. Loretta Casteen, Should Homosexuals be Banned from Adopting Children?, at
http://www.postaholics.com/cgi/news/get.cgi/gayadopt.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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deprived children.14 Florida’s statutory ban on homosexual adoption worsens
the situation simply because the court will not open its eyes and acknowledge
the devastating statistics. In upholding this ban, Judge King was blind to the
truth that the majority of families today do not fit into the cookie cutter image
of a family from the past.15 The families that do fit this ideal mold are not
often interested in adopting “special needs” children.16 In Florida’s most
recent denial of homosexual rights, the court in Lofton v. Kearney17 discussed a
legitimate purpose that lingers in the background of the Court’s decision:
finding the best possible homes for Florida’s foster children.18 While the
purpose appears legitimate, it feigns naivety. The upholding of the statutory
prohibition on homosexual adoptions in Florida is not assisting in finding the
best homes for Florida’s children; it is altogether denying the children of a
home.
By adhering to the social stigma that homosexuality is immoral and wrong,
the Court’s decision in Lofton v. Kearney19 denies many children loving
families. The facts of this case evoke powerful questions: how do you tell a
ten-year-old boy, who is HIV positive, that he is not entitled to the love and
support of the only parents he has ever known and loved? How can a federal
appeals court uphold a statute that leaves more children without homes and
more deserving adults childless? How can these situations where parentless
children are denied the happiness of a permanent home possibly be in the best
interest of the child, as claimed by the judge in Lofton v. Kearney? It appears
that in Lofton, the BIOC standard has been misused in order to discriminate
against homosexuals and protect society from all the fears and misconceptions
surrounding homosexuality. How unfortunate that the federal judge hearing
Lofton could not recognize how badly the Florida homosexual adoption
provision was and still is hurting the one class of people the BIOC aims to
protect: the children. This commentary on Lofton v. Kearney analyzes the
reasoning employed by the federal judge in the Southern District of Florida in
upholding the ban on homosexual adoptions, as well as the abuse of the BIOC.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the impact of sexual
orientation on the rights of individuals: the general purpose, adoption policies,
and different jurisdictional approaches surrounding the controversial topic of
homosexual adoption rights. Part II focuses on the state of Florida and it’s
14. Id.
15. Jodi L. Bell, Note, Prohibiting Adoption by Same-Sex Couples: Is it in the “Best Interest
of the Child?”, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 345, 346 (2001); see also Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a
More Realistic Definition of “Family,” 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91 (1991).
16. Lin, supra note 1, at 771.
17. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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categorical ban on such adoptions. In Part III the Comment examines the case
of Lofton v. Kearney and the decision to uphold the homosexual adoption
provision of the state adoption statute. Finally, in Part IV, the Comment
evaluates the real effects and reasoning behind the Lofton decision and the
impact the case makes on our nation’s children. This Comment opposes a per
se ban on homosexual adoptions and emphatically rejects the decisions of the
Southern District of Florida Court and the Florida Legislature and their belief
that homosexual orientation alone renders an individual unfit as a parent.
II. BACKGROUND
Opponents to homosexual adoptions claim that allowing homosexual
adoptions is “a victory for homosexual activism and a defeat for children
already bruised in life and in need of an intact, committed husband-and-wife
family.”20 They further argue, “[c]hildren need a role model, both male and
female.”21 Adversaries of homosexual adoption contend that the joint
relationship of mother and father contains essential characteristics needed in
child rearing that are not provided by homosexual couples.22 Opponents claim
that this denial of homosexual adoption rights is not based on discrimination
against homosexuals; rather, opponents believe that the very nature of the
homosexual relationship makes gay couples unable to provide the child an
“ideal environment.”23
On the other side of the debate are the advocates for homosexual adoption
who insist, “Sexual orientation is not the issue. Parenting ability is the
issue.”24 Supporters of the homosexual adoptions argue that one’s sexual
orientation or marital status does not affect the “parenting ability” of adoptive
parents.25 Such mixed feelings on homosexuals as prospective parents result
from deep-rooted moral disapproval and homophobia that is still prevalent in
today’s society.26
A.

Homosexual Rights Historically

When a homosexual individual enters into the adoption equation, things
become more complex, and judicial involvement becomes nearly inevitable.
20. Phil Belin, My Two Dads, 2 PRINCETON UNIV. L.J., at http://www.princeton.edu/
~lawjourn/Spring98/belin.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
21. Laura Parker, Daddy, Father, Son Adoption by N. J. Gays Spark Praise, Criticism, USA
TODAY, December 19, 1997, at 1A.
22. Id.; Belin, supra note 20.
23. Belin, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Judith A. Lintz, Note, The Opportunities, or Lack Thereof, for Homosexual Adults to
Adopt Children, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471, 487 (1990).
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In order to comprehend the difficulty accompanying child custody concerning
homosexual parents, an appropriate understanding of the social outlook and
underlying biases towards individuals with a same sex orientation is necessary.
1. Sodomy Laws: The Root of Sexual Orientation Based Discrimination
The contemporary intolerance towards homosexuality stems from ancient
Judeo-Christian proscriptions against sodomy, which was considered a sinful
act.27 Historically, the American legal system has tried to enforce presumed
cultural and moral norms by the means of laws that dictate who individuals
may have sex with and how.28 Predating the foundation of our nation there
have been different forms of criminalization of sexual activity between persons
of the same sex.29
Sodomy laws, which were imported into the American colonies from
English common law, underlie present discrimination against gay men and
lesbian women because homosexuals are automatically labeled as criminals
since they “violate the sodomy law whenever they engage in the very acts that
define them as gay men and lesbians.”30 Sodomy laws criminalize private
consensual behavior between adults and engender the irrational prejudice that
underlies all discrimination against gay men and lesbian women.31 While
homosexuality is not limited to the particular sex acts that sodomy embraces,
the social stigma assigned to acts of sodomy has transferred to homosexuals,
who have been declared a new class of deviants in today’s culture.32
27. JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY
PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 8-16 (1980) (discussing religious justification for punishing
homosexuality based on a deep rooted assumption that homosexuality is detrimental to society).
The reasons that homosexuality has historically been viewed as a detriment to society is because
it is unnatural and non-procreative. See ROGER J. MAGNUSON, ARE GAY RIGHTS RIGHT?:
MAKING SENSE OF THE CONTROVERSY 109-16 (1990) (characterizing homosexual behavior as
immoral and validating arguments with biblical scriptures and references that are purported to
condemn homosexual behavior).
28. American Civil Liberties Union, Lesbian and Gay Rights, at http://www.aclufl.org/
body_18.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
29. Rhonda R. Rivera, Legal Issues in Gay and Lesbian Parenting, in GAY AND LESBIAN
PARENTS 199-200 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987). Rhode Island passed its first sodomy law in
1662. Although some states had no criminal sodomy statutes, they adopted instead the common
law of England. Id.
30. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See generally Abby R. Rubenfeld,
Lessons Learned: A Reflection Upon Bowers v. Hardwick, 11 NOVA L. REV. 59, 60 (1986).
31. Allan H. Terl, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida, 24 NOVA
L. REV. 793 (2000) (citing Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 59).
32. John D’Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics
and History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 915, 918 (1986) (acknowledging the difference
between sexual acts or conduct and sexual orientation and identity); O’Toole, supra note 4, at 132
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Despite the existence of these sodomy laws there has been a slow trend
beginning in the early 1960’s to decriminalize consensual, private sexual
behavior.33 A big contribution to this decriminalization was the American Law
Institute’s (ALI) elimination of criminal penalties for all sexual behaviors
except those involving minors, coercion or force and public indecency in the
Model Penal Code.34 In this trend moving away from sexual orientation based
discrimination, numerous state legislatures have followed the ALI’s lead and
have decriminalized adult, consensual, private sexual conduct.35 A number of
state supreme courts including Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and
Pennsylvania have also decriminalized this behavior by declaring such sodomy
laws violative of the state constitutions.36 Today, sodomy laws are only
enforced in twenty-three states, as opposed to the unanimous nationwide
imposition of the recent past.37
2. The Broadened Impact of Sodomy Laws on Homosexuals
The deeply rooted discrimination resulting from sodomy laws is a
prejudice that same-sex orientated individuals are forced to face in every facet
of their lives, whether it be housing, employment, military, marriage or, as in
this case, parenting.38 While things seem bleak for homosexuals, many

(discussing how labeling homosexuals as deviants is an important distinction as it “makes the
beginning of the treatment of a segment of the population as a race apart”).
33. Rivera, supra note 29, at 199 (discussing the roots of the problem of discrimination and
sodomy laws in general).
34. Id.
35. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are among the states that have
moved to decriminalize sodomy.
36. See State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1977); Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 414
N.E.2d 602 (Mass. 1980); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980).
37. American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Lesbian and Gay Rights, at
http://www.aclufl.org/body_18.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002) (discussing the struggle for
homosexuals still occurring as a repercussion of the sodomy laws that were enacted and the
statistics of current state laws on sodomy). Six of the twenty-three states that currently uphold
sodomy laws only apply them to individuals of same sex orientation. The other seventeen states
apply sodomy statutes to both hetero and homosexual individuals.Even so, the primary effect of
sodomy statutes is to “sanction discrimination against lesbian and gay male sex.” Id.
38. Id. Sodomy laws act as invasions of the intimate realm of sexual expression and have
provided a legal basis justifying a wide range of discrimination against lesbians and gay men in
the areas of housing, employment and parenting. Statistics show that millions of Americans are
still denied equality in the areas of child custody, access to housing and public accommodation
because they are or are perceived to be homosexual. Sexual orientation based discrimination is
now regulated in the military as well. Id.
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jurisdictions and organizations seem to be on the right path.39 Despite recent
efforts to curb discrimination based on sexual orientation, many barriers still
thwart equal treatment of homosexuals.40 In forty-three states it is still legal to
discriminate based on sexual orientation.
Currently, only the state of Hawaii has afforded same-sex marriages legal
recognition.41 “The judiciary has unanimously inferred prohibitions of samesex marriage from silent state statutes.”42 In Singer v. Hara, the long-standing
American and English common law notion of marriage as a “legal union of one
man and one woman as husband and wife” was upheld.43 The belief that
homosexuals are not entitled the right to marry is attributable to the longstanding societal view of marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children.44 Although this is not possible and is
not done by all married, heterosexual couples, procreation is impossible for
homosexuals. Thus, the traditional understanding of marriage is inapplicable
for homosexual couples.45

39. Id. Eight states including California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia, and over one-hundred
municipalities have banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment, housing,
and public accommodations. Many private institutions, corporations, and universities have
enacted “domestic partnership” programs, affording various benefits to homosexuals. Id.
40. Id. Many employment decisions are based on sexual orientation. There have been many
“hate crimes” against gay people and millions are still denied equality in the areas of custody of
children, housing, and public accommodations. Id.
41. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (overturning a prior case in the
state of Hawaii that held same-sex marriages were not recognized); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993); see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 77 (2d ed. 1987); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition
of “Family,” 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 100 (1991). No court having heard a case on the issue has
upheld a same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa.
1984).
42. Comment, Homosexuals’ Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative
Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 196 (1979).
43. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding the state’s denial of
a marriage for gay couples was required by the state statute, such a holding is permitted by both
the state and federal constitutions); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and
accepted feature of the instruction of marriage, an institution which the state not only must allow,
but which it has fostered and protected.”).
44. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195 (stating that rather than a discriminatory rationale, the reason
for not recognizing same-sex marriages is the unique characteristics of the different sexes and the
goal of procreation).
45. Id. (recognizing that married couples are not required to have children and other married
couples are physically unable to have children). Even so, these situations are the exception, and,
as a general rule, married couples have children. The state further rationalizes that no same-sex

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

206

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:199

While forty-nine of the fifty states have been unable to make a
commitment for equal rights regarding same-sex marriages, more than two
Such
dozen cities have enacted “domestic partnership” ordinances.46
ordinances extend legal recognition to unmarried cohabiters and also confer
homosexual couples with economic benefits that married couples typically
receive.47 Even in a minimal percentage of cites that do recognize “domestic
partnerships,” some marriage advantages are not provided for homosexuals.
The major denial that homosexuals, even ones recognized in a “domestic
partnership,” face is the inability to adopt a child.48
B.

The Nature of Adoption

It is undisputed that there is no fundamental right to adopt,49 nor does there
exist a fundamental right to be adopted.50 Adoption is a privilege created by
statute, however, it is a privilege that is offered primarily to heterosexual
married couples and almost always denied to homosexuals who are nonbiological parents.51 Thus, states have broad discretion in limiting adoption.52
While adoption is denied status as a fundamental right, adoption is of great
importance because a person’s interest in raising children is fundamental and

couple offers the possibility of birth by a child of their union. Thus, the refusal of the state to
authorize same-sex marriage results from such impossibility of reproduction rather than from an
invidious discrimination “on account of sex”. Id.
46. Lesbian and Gay Rights, supra note 37.
47. Id. Typically, even though “domestic partnerships” do not confer all of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage, they grant registered partners sick and bereavement leave and
insurance and survivorship benefits for city employees. New York, Los Angeles, Seattle,
Minneapolis, and San Francisco are among the cities that recognize domestic partnerships. Id.
48. Id. Married individuals are always preferred over single parents in like circumstances.
The fact that homosexuals cannot ever be married in the legal sense of the term means they are
faced with an immense disadvantage. This disadvantage begins just by the essence of the fact
that homosexuals are not married. Once other factors such as social stigma, stereotyping, and
myths about individuals of same sex orientation are factored in, the hope of adoption is severely
frustrated and in some states impossible. Id.
49. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp 1372, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Bell, supra note 15, at 347;
see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). The policy reason behind not
recognizing a fundamental right to adopt is due to the permanent nature of fundamental rights.
“By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right of liberty interest, we to a great
extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.” Id. at 720.
50. Id.
51. See In re Palmer’s Adoption, 176 So. 537 (Fla. 1937); see also Russman, supra note 1.
52. Danielle Epstein & Lena Mukherjee, Note, Constitutional Analysis of the Barriers SameSex Couples Face in Their Quest to Become a Family Unit, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT,
782, 798-99 (1996).
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has been recognized as an essential element in the pursuit of happiness.53 In
order to understand the impact of judicial decisions on homosexual rights
regarding prospective parents, it is imperative to understand the purpose and
privilege that adoption offers all individuals that are unable, for one reason or
another, to have biological children of their own.
Historically, the goal of adoption was to match a married couple with their
selection of a suitable child.54 Throughout the 1970’s adoption became a much
more complex process, accordingly, the court’s role in adoptions has become
much greater.55 In the midst of the growing complexity of adoptions parents
have been categorized as either “desirable” or “undesirable.”56 Traditionally,
“desirable” children, healthy white infants, are placed with the “desirable”
families in “the bastion of American normalcy, heterosexual Caucasian
couples with above-average incomes.”57 “Undesirable” children are children
with handicaps, older in age, or of a minority dissent.58 These undesirable
children, which comprise the majority of children awaiting adoption, are
labeled “hard to place” and are matched with “undesirable parents.”59
Homosexual parents fall into the “undesirable” category.60
Today the goal of adoption is to provide the child with a permanent
home.61 This goal signifies a decreased burden from the traditional adoption
goal, which required that the child match the adoptive home in every way
possible, including physical attributes, religion, intellectual ability, and other

53. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 139 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[C]ertain interest and practices,” such as child
rearing, “form the core of the definition of liberty.”).
54. See Sanford N. Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values in the
Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAM. L. 7, 8 (1964) (discussing the changing focus of adoption over
time).
55. Id.; see also Bell, supra note 15.
56. JOY A. SCHULENBURG, GAY PARENTING 99 (1985); Russman, supra note 1, at 50.
57. SCHULENBURG, supra note 56, at 99 (acknowledging that healthy white babies are
usually adopted by white heterosexual couples).
58. Id.
59. Id. (declaring that undesirable parents are most likely to adopt undesirable children).
60. Id.; see also Joseph Evall, Sexual Orientation and Adoptive Matching, 25 FAM. L.Q.
347, 352 (1991). Homosexuals wishing to adopt children must overcome many obstacles. There
are barriers placed on homosexual adoptions under all forms of government. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (1992) (placing a per se prohibition on homosexual adoptions); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1992).
61. Bell, supra note 15, at 348. This is a change from the traditional goal where adoption
agencies preferred to leave a child in an institutional setting rather than place them with a family
that did not reflect similar characteristics of the child. Id.
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such characteristics.62 Today’s notion of adoption is much more realistic;
along with increased feasibility comes a lesser focus on stringent and
superficial requirements.63 In turn, the disappearance of the superficial and
“perfect” matching requirements opens the door to non-traditional parents to
adopt when they are “suitably qualified to care for and rear the child” and
when the adoption will promote the child’s best interest.64 The current judicial
decisions regarding adoption focus and depend on the BIOC. The decisions
have moved away from the rigorous standards that made adoptions too rare in
consideration of the number of children placed in agencies.65 In this shift to
the BIOC, recent judicial decisions and legislative proposals have furthered the
principle that one’s affiliation with a particular class of people alone should not
alone preclude one’s eligibility to adopt.66
C. A New Standard: The BIOC
Since 1988, faced with a decision of child placement, courts have applied
the BIOC standard.67 While the BIOC is used across the nation, each court
differs in their interpretation of what the standard entails.68 The subjective
nature and the broad discretion of the standard bestows great power upon the
states and judges. With such discretion they can incorporate their own
feelings, beliefs, and biases under the pretext of the BIOC. 69 Regrettably, in

62. Id. (discussing the traditional adoption goal and the inflexibility of its application which
ends with a negative result and leaving many children unnecessarily caught in the adoption
system).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 5-7 (1998).
66. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that appellant’s bisexuality is not unlawful and cannot be the lone factor in
rendering him unfit for parenthood); see also In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24-26
(N.H. 1987) (requirement by the court that there be a rational governmental purpose to preclude
eligibility for adoption by an entire group of individuals).
67. Felicia E. Lucious, Note, Adoption of Tammy: Should Homosexuals Adopt Children?, 21
S.U. L. REV. 171, 175 (1994).
68. Bell, supra note 15, at 358.
69. See Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and
Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1989) (noting that the best interest standard often
includes the court’s morality judgments); Judith A. Lintz, Note, The Opportunities, or Lack
Thereof, for Homosexual Adults to Adopt Children, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471, 487-93 (1990);
SCHULENBURG, supra note 56, at 100 (recognizing judicial bias towards homosexuals as parents);
see also G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (denying the mother custody
because she was in a lesbian relationship and the court was unable to ignore the possible effects
this sexual orientation of the mother may have on the child’s moral development); S.E.G. v.
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many adoption cases the court has used the BIOC as a means to discriminate
and act upon biases against homosexuals.70 To understand the danger of a
misused BIOC, it is essential to understand that courts have used the standard
to apply a resounding ban on homosexual adoptions.71 Using the BIOC to
uphold custody determinations on the basis of sexual orientation is a
misapplication of the standard.72 Allowing the sexual orientation of an
individual be the sole factor for adoption is unconstitutional and against the
BIOC.73 This is not to say that the sexual orientation of the individual should
not be a factor in the consideration; it just means that the sexual orientation has
to be considered in a reasonable light, accounting for other factors. The
customary factors a court considers in determining if an adoptive placement is
in the child’s best interest are: the home environment of the parents, the
stability of the parents, the time a parent and child spend together, the physical
and emotional support the child receives from the parents, the quality of the
relationship between the parent and child, sexual conduct, criminal
background, as well as any other factors that the court may deem appropriate.74
D. Myths and Realities of Homosexual Parenthood
There are a number of reasons and misconceptions offered time and again
for not allowing homosexuals to adopt children. The most common of these
misconceptions are: that homosexuals are more promiscuous than the average
heterosexual, that they fail to form the committed and stable relationships
needed in raising a child, and that they are more likely to molest a child.75
Another claim is that homosexual parents are somehow attempting to “recruit”
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding mother’s open lesbian relationship
presented an “unhealthy environment” for minors).
70. See Epstein & Mukherjee, supra note 52, at 802; Lin, supra note 1. See generally
Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
71. See supra note 61; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997) (placing a per se
prohibition on homosexual adoptions).
72. See Bell, supra note 15, at 358 (discussing the many factors that must be considered
under the BIOC).
73. See Ali, supra note 69, at 1010 (noting that more and more courts are recognizing that
prohibiting homosexuals from adopting or gaining custody of children is not in the child’s best
interest).
74. Hembree v. Hembree, 660 So. 2d 1342, 1345 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (level of care a
parent provides for the child discussed as a factor in determining custody); Tucker v. Tucker, 910
P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah 1996) (assessing the amount of time the parent spends with the child and
the adult’s stability as factors for custody determinations); Bell, supra note 15, at 358 (listing the
factors of the BIOC that courts should take into consideration). See generally Ward v. Ward, 742
So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The court was forced to balance whether it is better to
place a child with a lesbian mother or a father with a criminal conviction in his background. The
court chose to award custody to the father. Id.
75. O’Toole, supra note 4.
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children into the homosexual lifestyle.76 In addition many people fear that the
child of a homosexual will suffer from bias by homophobic individuals in the
form of teasing and harassment.77 These common misconceptions have caused
the homosexual community great pain and have kept many potential families
apart for reasons that are both wrong and unconstitutional.
The first myths or alleged harms act as buffers for child-parent
connections. One myth that courts rely on in denying homosexual adoptions is
that homosexual parents are more likely to molest their children than
heterosexual parents.78 There is no evidentiary basis for this claim. Actually,
empirical data shows that heterosexual males are the most likely to molest their
children by an overwhelming percentage.79 “Every expert will testify to a
court that eighty-five percent of all molestation involves men who are
heterosexually oriented while only about fourteen percent concerns men who
are homosexually oriented.”80 Studies show that a child is one hundred times
more likely to be sexually abused by the heterosexual partner of a relative than
by a gay adult.81
Another common myth imposed by society on the subject of gay parenting
is that the children of homosexuals will become gay.82 It is unanimous among
commentators that this claim is the most ludicrous.83 Most homosexuals, who
have been asked, comment that either they are impartial to the sexual
orientation of their child or that they want their children to grow up as
heterosexuals.84 Such myths about homosexuality have stood as obstacles and
barriers for homosexuals in so many aspects of life. Now the stereotypes have
reached parenting ability and have been the cause of extensive of litigation and
legislation.
E.

Jurisdictional Approaches

Over the last several decades, many prohibitions have been placed on
homosexual adoptions. Courts are denying adoption petitions of homosexual

76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Rivera, supra note 29, at 210.
78. O’Toole, supra note 4.
79. Patterson, supra note 4.
80. Rivera, supra note 29, at 211; see also D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED
212-17 (1977); Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement,
70 YALE L.J. 623, 629 (1961) (noting that pedophilia, a sexual preference for children, is distinct
from homosexuality).
81. Id.; see also Charlotte J. Patterson, Research Summary on Lesbian and Gay Parenting, at
http://www.apa.org/pi/parent.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
82. Rivera, supra note 29, at 211.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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couples while legislatures are adopting statutory amendments to adoption
statutes, which serve to preclude homosexuals from becoming adoptive
parents.85 Any inconsistency in state legislative approaches to regulate
homosexual adoptions is the consequence of adoption being denied recognition
as a fundamental right.86 Today, many states are silent on the issue of
homosexual adoption. “This silence leaves the subject open to interpretation
by the courts and subject to the stereotypes that plague homosexuals.”87 A
minority of the states have made explicit provisions in their statutes either
expressly authorizing or prohibiting homosexual adoption rights.88 Most of the
jurisdictions either allow or deny homosexuals the right to adopt based on case
law and the court’s interpretation of the BIOC.
1.

States Permitting Homosexual Adoptions

In Holden and Galluccio v. New Jersey Department of Human Services,89
New Jersey became the first state to explicitly allow lesbian and gay couples to
adopt children jointly and on an equal basis with married couples.90 The

85. Langemak, supra note 5, at 829 (noting that “legislatures are fostering statutory
amendments to adoption statutes which serve to preclude homosexuals from becoming adoptive
parents”).
86. Bell, supra note 15, at 345-49 (commenting on the lack of uniformity and consistency
from one jurisdiction to the next regarding all adoption cases). The biggest inconstancy in court
approaches to adoptions is seen in the views and decisions regarding adoptions sought by parents
of same-sex orientation. Id.
87. Id. at 350. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.005 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE § 600.1
(2001); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-37 (2000); WIS. STAT. § 48.82 (1992). No mention of same-sex
couples in state adoption statutes is made, thus leaving it up to the court’s discretion. Silent states
have adoption decisions that are shaped by the courts through judicial precedent and
interpretation there from. See also Lin, supra note 1, at 768 (discussing the absence of statutory
proscriptions against same-sex couple adoption).
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1999) (“No person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”); 1999 N.H. LAWS 18:4 (before the statue was
repealed it stated, “any individual not a minor and not a homosexual may adopt”). In 1999, the
New Hampshire legislature responded to the state court’s decision to ban homosexual adoptions
and omitted this provision. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1994). Since the repeal of the
New Hampshire prohibition on homosexual adoptions, Florida has become the only legislature to
expressly prohibit such adoptions in their state statutes.
89. See Parker, supra note 21.
90. Belin, supra note 19 (citing Holden and Galluccio v. New Jersey Dept. of Human
Services, Bergen County Superior Court (1997)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-43(a) (providing that
“any person may institute an action for adoption, except that a married person may do so only
with the written consent of his spouse or jointly with his spouse in the same action or if living
separate and apart from his child”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-40 (providing that the standard in
selecting adoptive parents is “the best interest of the child”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54
(empowering the Department of Youth and Family Service to administer New Jersey’s adoption
statute).
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Holden court found that denying same-sex couples the right to adopt violated
three state statutes, and, therefore, the court annulled the ban on adoptions by
non-married couples.91 This decision has the force of law in the state of New
Jersey. It empowers unmarried couples under the impression that they have
been denied the right to adopt based on either marital status or sexual
orientation to seek relief in court.92 New Jersey is not the only state consenting
to same-sex child rearing.
Hawaii’s permission for same-sex adoptions has evolved as a result of the
legality of same-sex marriages in the state. The Hawaii Circuit Court’s1996
decision in Baehr v. Miike93 overturned a prior decision denying same-sex
marriages legal recognition.94 In this holding the court implicitly accepted the
argument that same-sex couples could provide “an ideal environment for child
rearing.”95
Likewise, Vermont has taken steps to recognize the rights of same-sex
couples.96While the Civil Union Law does not extend homosexuals the right to
marry, it does provide them several protections characteristic of marriage.97
For instance, homosexuals are given protection in inheritance, property
division, child custody and support, family leave, and state tax benefits in
recognition of their partnerships.98 Included in this recognition is the
legitimizing of children born to same-sex partners.99
New Hampshire amended their state adoption statute in 1987. The
amendment provided that “any individual not a minor and not a homosexual

91. Belin, supra note 20.
92. Id. Please note the decision by the court in Holden does not affect cases involving
private adoptions.
93. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
94. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld state bans
on homosexual marriages). Several years later the court overruled this decision and declared
homosexual marriage legal in Hawaii. The central thrust of Baehr’s appeal was that same-sex
couples could provide an “ideal” home for children. In the appeal, Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL
694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), the court implicitly affirmed that same-sex couples can provide an
ideal environment for child rearing.
95. 1996 WL 694235 at 17. The legalization of same-sex marriage opened the door for
adoptions by same-sex couples. The court was convinced by the expert evidence presented at
trial that children raised by same-sex parents were as “happy, healthy and well adjusted” as
children brought up in a heterosexual parent setting. Id.
96. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (2000) (the Act Relating to Civil Unions provides
same-sex families virtually the same statutory rights accorded to heterosexual families).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See VT. STAT. ANN tit. 15 §1201, 1204 (2000) (the civil union act intends that children
who are born to same-sex parents in the state of Vermont will be considered legitimate and will
not be treated differently merely because of the sexual orientation of their parents).
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may adopt.”100 This statutory ban on homosexual adoption was given the
stamp of approval by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in In re Opinion
of the Justices.101 The state’s legislation barring the opportunity for
homosexuals to adopt was repealed in May of 1999 as the statute was
considered to be “replete with stereotypes.” The state determined that families
should be recognized based on fitness, not “prejudicial stereotypes.”102 While
New Hampshire was making a movement toward equal protection and away
from sexual orientation based discrimination, a few states joined Florida in
their crusade against adoptions by same-sex couples.103
2. States Prohibiting Homosexual Adoptions
The vast majority of states refuse to enact statutory prohibitions on
adoptions based solely on sexual orientation. Consequentially, most states
wishing to prohibit homosexual adoptions have done so exclusively through
the judicial system.104 Although Florida and Mississippi are the only states
with express provisions outlawing homosexual adoptions, many other states
have attempted to follow Florida’s lead and prohibit homosexual adoptions
without success.105
Utah and Mississippi have amended their adoption statutes to
accommodate for the societal change and recent trend for same-sex couples to

100. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B: 4 (1997).
101. See generally In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
102. Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their
Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 896 (2000).
103. See H.R. 90, 156th sess. (N.H. 1999); Legis. Serv. Reg. 2012 (N.H. 1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-1 (2000) (denying adoptions to all unmarried cohabitants). Utah law also prohibits
same-sex marriages, and, therefore, the amended adoption law in Utah effectively precludes
homosexual couples that live together the right to adopt. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3
(2000) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”).
104. See supra note 86.
105. H.J.R. 35, 1998 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (the Alabama Legislature proposed an
amendment to its adoption statute stating, “any adult person, who is not a homosexual, or
husband and wife jointly who are adults may petition the court to adopt a minor”). The Alabama
adoption statute never enacted this proposal. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5 (1998); S.B. 904 2001
Gen. Assem., 114th Sess. (S.C. 2001). South Carolina attempted to make a similar amendment to
their state adoption statute proposing to prohibit any person “who is a homosexual or bisexual
from petitioning the court to adopt a child.” Likewise this proposal didn’t pass. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-1670 (Law. Co-op. 1998). Michigan also made the same proposal, but it did not
pass into the state adoption statute. See H.R. 6236, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998) (stating “a
child shall not be placed with a prospective adoptive parent and the court shall not issue an
adoption order if a person authorized to place the child or the court authorized to issue the order
has reliable information that the prospective adoptive parent is homosexual”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 710.22a (West 1998) (there is no mention of prohibition on homosexual adoption
rights in the current Michigan adoption statute).
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attempt to adopt children.106 The Utah state legislature enacted an adoption
statute that denies adoptions to all unmarried cohabitants.107 This change
stemmed from a legislative finding that it is not in the best interest of a child to
be adopted by persons who are co-habitating in a relationship that is not legally
binding.108 Utah laws refuse to recognize same-sex marriages, and, therefore,
the amended adoption law necessarily acts as an effective preclusion on any
same-sex couple living together in the state of Utah who wishes to adopt a
child.109
Similar to Utah and Florida, the state of Mississippi enacted a new law that
took effect in July of 2000. The modified Mississippi statute states, “Adoption
by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”110 The Mississippi legislature
was prompted to make this amendment in response to Vermont’s recent
finding that same-sex couples could provide children with an ideal
environment.111 Mississippi’s statute reflects their belief that family values do
not coincide with homosexual relations as an appropriate lifestyle.112
No state has a ban on homosexual adoption as exclusive and long standing
as Florida.113 The Florida statute which has given rise to many lawsuits and
legal discussions is referred to as the “homosexual adoption provision,” and it
states, “No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person
is a homosexual.”114
III. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
A.

The History of Homosexual Rights in Florida

The state of Florida has a history of discrimination against gay men and
lesbian women. The state legislature has constantly refused to recognize
homosexuality as an entity by existing laws, instead defining homosexuality as
individual illegal acts, violative of sex offense statutes.115 Dating back to
1868, Florida’s sexual orientation based discrimination began with a sodomy
statute that classified homosexual activities as “crimes against nature.”116

106. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-1, 9 (2000).
107. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2000).
108. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (2000); see supra note 82.
109. Carrasquillo Hedges, supra note 102, at 896.
110. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000) (denoting a per se ban on same-sex adoptions,
emulating the state of Florida).
111. See supra note 79; see also Hedges, supra note 102, at 896.
112. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
114. Id.
115. Terl, supra note 31, at 797.
116. Id. at 794.
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Florida’s homosexual citizens have never been able to free themselves of the
sodomy laws and their accompanying social stigma. Homosexuals in the state
are still considered criminals, and Florida takes every chance it gets to remind
the world that homosexuality is statutorily criminal.117 Several examples
through the decades highlight the kind of discrimination homosexuals suffer in
Florida.
In 1954, the City of Miami in Dade County enacted an ordinance
prohibiting alcoholic beverage licensees either from knowingly employing,
selling to, or allowing homosexuals, lesbians, or perverts to congregate in the
store.118 Just several years later the Florida legislature grew dissatisfied with
the state sodomy statute and started down a long road of repression for
homosexuals by enacting Investigative Committees.119
Investigative
Committees were comprised of a network of informants who went undercover
and spied at “homosexual hangouts,” looking for a chance to catch suspected
homosexuals.120 Informants bugged conversations, took pictures and then
Within seven years of these Investigative
reported to the police.121
Committees seventy-one teaching certificates were revoked and thirty-nine
deans and professors were removed from universities.122
In 1970, a lesbian couple was denied the right to marriage even though
Florida law did not statutorily prohibit same-sex marriages.123 In its reason for
depriving the homosexual couple recognition of a legal union the court stated,
“The main object of marriage is the procreation of progeny, and it would
therefore be contrary to public policy to grant them the licenses applied for.”124
While all of the barriers placed on same-sex couples in the state of Florida
have encroached upon the rights and privileges of homosexual individuals, in
recent years adoption and custody disputes have become the battlefield of the
homophobia war.
B.

Florida Adoption Laws

117. Id.
118. Terl, supra note 31, at 795 (citing MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCE 5135 (1954) (codified at
MIAMI, FLA. CODE § 4-13 (1967))).
119. Id.
120. Terl, supra note 31, at 795 (analyzing the state of Florida’s treatment toward
homosexuals starting with sodomy laws and traveling through the decades of the fifty’s, sixty’s,
and so on up to the current state where litigation has hit its peek regarding the states denial of
rights and freedoms to an entire class of individuals: homosexuals).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 801.
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Insofar as homosexual adoption is concerned, Florida has the most
restrictive adoption statutes in the nation.125 In 1977, the Florida legislature
amended their state adoption statute to include the provision, “No person
eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual.”126 This provision prohibits all gay men and lesbian women from
adopting children, regardless of all other circumstances.127 Despite this
prohibition on adoption, homosexuals are afforded the opportunity to act as
foster parents in the state of Florida.128 The rationale behind this provision is
the furtherance of public morality and the protection and well being of persons
being adopted.129
Within the borders of Florida alone, 16,500 children await adoption.130
Fourteen thousand five hundred of these children are prolonging the temporary
nature of the foster care system.131 The majority of these children are difficult
to place, and the foster care system is overflowing with special needs children
for which there are an insufficient number of adoptive homes.132 Statistics
indicate that, of the children awaiting adoption or foster placement, 80%
percent wait more than two years, while 36% wait more than four years.133
The Florida statute ignores these statistics. By enacting the homosexual
adoption provision, Florida has taken an active measure assuring that the state
foster care and adoption agencies will continue to be overburdened because
there are no available homes for placement.134
C. Prior Case Law in Florida

125. See supra notes 80 through 92 (discussing state statutes and case law permitting
homosexual adoptions, as in the case of New Hampshire, Hawaii and Vermont); see also supra
note 86 (commenting on the fact that most states are silent on the issue of same-sex adoption
rights); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2000) (advocating a more inadvertent, roundabout way of
prohibiting same-sex adoptions).
126. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
127. Amy Berg, Suit in Florida Challenges Anti-Gay Adoption Ban, at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/495/context/archive (Aug. 16, 2001). Note,
ironically, Florida allows homosexuals to act as foster parents for children awaiting adoption.
128. See generally Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
129. Id.
130. Berg, supra note 127.
131. Id.
132. Id. Some examples of special needs children are those with attention deficit disorder,
asthma, autism, fetal alcohol syndrome, epilepsy, and mild mental conditions. Id.
133. Id. (citing statistics adopted by the Court in Lofton v. Kearney).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
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In 1990, the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida (hereinafter
ACLU) filed the first challenge to the discriminatory adoption statute.135 Ed
Seebol was a single gay man seeking to adopt a child.136 He indicated
willingness to adopt a difficult to place “special needs” child. The local office
of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS),
however, turned his application down specifically because his homosexuality
was noted on the application.137 The Circuit Court in Seebol v. Faire138 held
that Florida’s statutory prohibition against adoption by homosexuals was
unconstitutionally violative of equal protection and due process guarantees.139
The statue was also in violation of the individual’s right to privacy.140 The
Circuit Court’s decision in Seebol was never appealed, therefore, the holding
that the homosexual adoption provision was unconstitutional acts as precedent
only in Monroe County, Florida.141
In 1992, the ACLU filed suit on behalf of Bonnie Matthews and Elaine
Kohler, from whom the HRS removed a six-year-old boy who had been in
their foster care.142 The ACLU claimed that the Florida statute only prohibited
homosexuals from adopting and said nothing about foster care.143 In 1993, the
Circuit Court of Hillsborough County delivered a split decision saying that
they could not decide whether to prohibit a foster parent’s license based solely
on “sexual status.” The court did, however, uphold an HRS rule against
licensing unmarried couples as foster parents.144
Several years later, in Cox v. Florida Department of Health Rehabilitation
Services,145 a homosexual male couple from Sarasota challenged the Florida
statute forbidding adoption by homosexuals.146 In Cox, two men seeking to
adopt a special needs child were denied the opportunity to enroll in preadoption classes under § 63.042(3) because they disclosed their homosexuality
on the adoption applications.147 The court observed that the purpose of the

135. Terl, supra note 31, at 821 (discussing Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 1991)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 822 (citing a Letter from Carmen Dominguez Frick, District Legal Counsel, HRS
District XI, to Edward Seebol (May 10, 1990). Seebol had a respectable reputation in the
community and he served as executive director of AIDS Help, Inc.).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
143. Id. at 488.
144. Id. at 490.
145. Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).
146. Id.
147. Id.; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3).
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Florida adoption statute is to protect and promote the well being of adopted
children.148 The court reasoned that there was no evidence showing that
adoptions by homosexuals was not detrimental to the child and thereby
rejected the argument that adoption by homosexual adults may promote the
welfare of the child.149
Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick,150 the Florida District Court of Appeals in
Cox overcame a due process challenge to the Florida adoption statute by
holding that adoption was not a fundamental liberty and that homosexual
conduct was not a fundamental right.151 The court pointed to the presumption
that most children will grow up to be heterosexual adults as indicative that the
best interest of Florida’s children would be served by placing them with
heterosexual parents who could teach them how to relate to the opposite sex.152
This holding invoked a blanket presumption that homosexuals are inherently
unfit parents. Such a presumption taken in conjunction with the BIOC
automatically excludes all homosexuals from the pool of potential adoptive
parents.
One year later, in Ward v. Ward153 the First District Court of Appeals of
Florida awarded custody to a father with a criminal conviction over a lesbian
mother.154 In the custody award determination the court claims that they did
not base their decision on the mother’s sexual orientation. The court denied
the mother custodial rights because it found such placement would not be in
the child’s best interest.155 The mother and father divorced in 1992, and at that
time the parents stipulated that the mother would have primary custody over
their child.156 This stipulation was made with full knowledge of the mother’s
lesbian relationships.157
Approximately twenty years prior to the divorce and prior to the birth of
their children, the father was convicted of the second-degree murder of his first
wife.158 In spite of his criminal record, custody was awarded to the father
because he claimed that his daughter was being negatively affected by the
148. See supra note 31 (discussing the rational behind adoption statutes).
149. Cox, 656 So. 2d at 903.
150. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
151. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (holding there is no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual conduct).
152. 627 So. 2d at 1220.
153. Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1996).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 252.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (noting this crime was the result of stupidity, jealousy, and anger and he served eight
and a half years in prison for this crime).
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exposure she was subjected to while living with her lesbian mother.159 The
court claimed that it was not suggesting that the sexual orientation of the
custodial parent by itself justifies a custody change, but rather the central
question that must be determined is what conduct the child has been exposed to
and what effect that has on the child.160 This holding is a departure from the
Florida statute where the effects on the child are insignificant, and the only
important factor is the sexual orientation itself.161
The court in Ward referred to their decision in Maradie v. Maradie.162 In
this case the court laid out a test that required a direct bearing on the welfare of
the child, not the “moral unfitness” of a custodial parent, to act as a basis for
the deprivation of custody.163 Another school of thought is termed the “Dinkel
approach.”164 Under Dinkel, when the trier of fact made the determination that
the parent with primary residential custody was involved in a relationship that
adversely affected the child. Such relationship signified a substantial change
in circumstances and justified a change in custody. The sexual orientation of
the parent was immaterial in the determination.165
In Maradie v. Maradie,166 the First District Court of Appeals held that the
circuit court could not assume a homosexual environment would adversely
affect a child.167 In order for homosexuality to be found detrimental to the
child in a court of law, evidence of such a negative impact on the child was
required.168 In Packard v. Packard169 custody was awarded to a father, over
the lesbian mother, even though the father had been alleged to be violent to
both the mother and the child.170
These cases on homosexual adoption rights in the state of Florida
accumulated over several decades.
While some of these cases had
discriminatory reasoning and effects, this pattern was taken to another level in
the Judge James Lawrence King’s opinion in Lofton v. Kearney.171

159. 742 So. 2d at 253.
160. Id. at 254.
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
162. Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 542 (1996).
163. Id.
164. 742 So. 2d at 253 (holding the Dinkel approach is correct and properly places the
emphases on the best interest of the child).
165. Id. Note also in Ward that the court declined the opportunity to determine whether the
father’s criminal background precluded him from parental responsibility since the statute, section
61.13(2)(b), was not raised in the lower court.
166. Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 542.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Terl, supra note 31, at 828.
170. Id.
171. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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IV. THE ISSUE OF HOMOSEXUAL ADOPTION RIGHTS REVISITED
A homosexual man who was denied the opportunity to apply for adoption
of his foster child came before the U.S. District Court in the Southern District
of Florida to challenge the constitutionality of the homosexual adoption
provision. The State took their most firm and discriminatory stance on
homosexual adoption to date. The statute presumes each and every
homosexual unfit as an adoptive parent, even if the homosexual seeking to
adopt meets all other requirements of the state adoption statute. In Lofton, this
presumption was once again held constitutional.172
A.

Case Description of Lofton v. Kearney

Judge James Lawrence King heard the case of Lofton v. Kearney on
August 30, 2001.173 The plaintiffs were comprised of a group of homosexual
couples that had been denied the opportunity to adopt children under the
homosexual adoption provision in the Florida adoption statute.174 The primary
plaintiff was Steve Lofton, a pediatric nurse and “certified long-term foster
parent.”175
Lofton raised three foster children, all three of which were born HIV
positive.176 Two of the children developed AIDS but the third child, plaintiff
John Doe, successfully sero-converted during infancy and no longer tested
positive for HIV.177 Lofton cared for these foster children full-time and
administered their medications when they were sick.178 Lofton received the
Outstanding Foster Parenting award from the Children’s Home Society, a child
placement agency.179 Doe, at ten years of age, was freed for adoption, on May
19, 1994. In September of that year, Lofton submitted an application to adopt
Doe.180 Lofton was automatically disqualified from adopting Doe under the
homosexual adoption based on his sexual orientation.181
The second plaintiff is Douglas Houghton, Jr. who is a clinical nurse
specialist and legal guardian of child, Plaintiff John Roe.182 Houghton had
taken care of Roe since the child was four years old and was voluntarily left to
Houghton’s care by his father who was suffering from alcohol abuse and
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. (upholding the Florida Homosexual Adoption Provision).
Id.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1375.
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difficulties in keeping employment.183 Several years after Houghton attained
legal guardianship of Roe, Roe’s biological father terminated his parental
rights and Houghton decided to adopt Roe.184 Under Florida’s adoption
statute, Houghton was first required to receive a favorable preliminary home
study evaluation before the adoption could transpire.185 During this evaluation
Houghton was told that “but for his homosexuality and the homosexual
adoption provision he would have received favorable preliminary home study
evaluation.”186 Houghton was precluded from filing an adoption petition in the
State circuit court.187
The third plaintiff group was Wayne Smith and Daniel Skahen who
became licensed family foster parents in January of 2000.188 Since then, they
cared for three foster children, none of whom were free for adoption.189 Smith
and Skahen submitted an at-large adoption application upon which both men
admitted they were homosexual.190 Several months later they received written
notices from the State denying their applications on the basis that the
homosexual adoption provision prohibited gay men from adopting.191
The defendants were Kathleen Kearney, the Secretary of Florida’s
Department of Children and Families, and Charles Auslander, the District
Administrator of District XI of Florida’s Department of Children and
Families.192 These parties were sued in their official capacity, because they are
responsible for the enforcement of the homosexual adoption provision.193
Preliminarily there was a motion to dismiss and the court concluded that
all plaintiffs, with the exception of Lofton and Child Doe, had not actually
applied to become adoptive parents for any child and had not been denied the
opportunity to adopt. Therefore, the Court dismissed all other claims without
prejudice for lack of standing.194 Plaintiff’s (Lofton and Doe and Houghton
and Roe) amended the compliant to allege that the homosexual adoption

183. Id at 1376.
184. Id.
185. FLA. STAT. § 63.112(2)(b) (West 1997).
186. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (introducing the defendants in the case in their official
capacities).
193. Id. at 1378.
194. Lofton v. Kearney, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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provision violated their fundamental rights to equal protection, familial
privacy, intimate association, and family integrity.195
V. THE COURTS ANALYSIS
A.

Fundamental Rights of Familial Privacy, Intimate Association, and
Family Integrity, and the Due Process Clause

The court held that Fundamental rights are rights “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”196 Plaintiffs argued that the homosexual
adoption provision violated their fundamental rights to family privacy as
embodied in their alleged Constitutional right to the care, custody, and control
of the children, which the U.S. Supreme Court has declared as one of the oldest
fundamental liberty interests.197
The plaintiff’s argument was that the rights enjoyed by blood relatives
regarding childrearing should be extended to foster families and legal
guardians because the core of the liberty is the emotional bond that exists
between the family members as a result of the shared daily life and not as a
result of the blood relationship.198 The emotional bonds are especially strong
when children are in the homes of their caretakers since infancy or childhood
and are raised by the foster parents continuously without ever really knowing
their biological parents.199 The court did not contest that the emotional bonds
between plaintiffs and their children were present. Nor did they contest the
parent-child relationships were deeply loving.200
Even so, the court found that the existence of strong emotional bonds
between plaintiffs and the children they sought to adopt did not inherently
grant them a fundamental right to family privacy, intimate association, or
family integrity.201 Unlike natural families, the court found that “foster parents
195. See id. at 1378; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1994). See generally U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV (providing equal protection as a fundamental right that cannot be deprived). Since
the adoption statute only denies homosexuals the right to adopt, it appears that this cross section
of citizens is being denied equal protection. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing individual
freedoms of which cannot be deprived). This includes the right to familial privacy.
196. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
197. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
198. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (arguing that the importance of a family to the individuals
involved as well as to society is rooted in the emotional bonds between parent and child and not
the biological relationship); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
(OFFER), 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
199. Id.
200. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1379 (the court realized that the relationship between
plaintiffs and their foster children were “as close as those between biological parents”).
201. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 (the Court acknowledged that a parent-child relationship between
an unrelated adult and child might exist and might enjoy Due Process guarantees, but the
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do not have a justifiable expectation of an enduring companionship because the
emotional ties originate under state law.”202 Although the concept of family
covers relationships outside of the archetypical nuclear family, the Constitution
only extends to families that are comprised of the traditionally recognized
characteristics of a family.203 The court held that foster families are grounded
in state law.204 The court believed that contractual arrangements and foster
care placement was typically meant to be a short, temporary placement while
the State seeks to find a permanent placement in an adoptive home.205 The
court claimed that plaintiffs understood that within the foster arrangement was
an implicit understanding that they would have to seek State approval in order
to adopt the children.206 The court acknowledged the need and value of foster
parents and guardians, but did not extend foster relationships the same rights
and interests as biological families, and therefore Lofton and Houghton had no
right to exclude the state from their family lives.207
B. Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution asserts,
“[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws.”208 This does not mean that the Equal Protection Clause
necessarily forbids classifications; it only means that governmental decisionmakers are prohibited from treating individuals who are alike in every relevant
respect differently.209 The federal judge in Lofton determined that the rational
basis test was appropriate because homosexuals are not a “suspect class” since
there is no fundamental right of familial privacy to foster parents.210 Under the
rational basis standard the statute is granted a strong presumption that it is

Supreme Court stopped short of identifying the foster parent-child relationship as one such
relationship).
202. Id. at 845.
203. See Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 921 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding there was no liberty interest in a foster parent-child relationship that existed for more
than two years).
204. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
209. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Panama City Med. Diagnostic Ltd. v.
Williams, 13 F.3d 1541 (11th Cir. 1994).
210. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (deciding that Plaintiffs, as homosexuals, were not a suspect
class because the Plaintiffs failed to show any case under which the court used a heightened level
of scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of classifications targeting homosexuals); see also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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reasonably related to a legitimate government interest and is valid under the
equal protection analysis.211 Accordingly, the homosexual adoption provision
shall be granted the presumption that it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest and the burden should be on the plaintiffs to negate “every conceivable
basis which might support it.”212
The State offered two “legitimate” purposes for the existence of the
provision.213 The first purpose was the State’s moral disapproval of
homosexuality, which was consistent with the legislature’s right to legislate
public morality.214 The court, however, held that public morality alone is
insufficient to justify the homosexual adoption provisions and “the government
cannot merely justify singling out a group of citizens for disfavor simply
because it morally disapproves of them.”215
The second legitimate interest claimed by the State was that the
homosexual adoption provision serves the best interest of Florida’s children.
The state asserted that the child’s best interest is to be raised in a home
stabilized by marriage, in a family consisting of both a mother and a father.216
Mother and father families are “important for the well-rounded growth and
development of the child.”217 According to the State, a married heterosexual
family provides adopted children with proper gender role modeling and
“minimized social stigmatization.”218 The plaintiffs claimed this stated
purpose was merely a pretext to the true reason for the enactment of the
homosexual adoption provision which was to exclude homosexuals. The court
claimed that it was inappropriate for them to determine whether the stated
reason actually motivated the legislature; plausible reasons are sufficient.219
Plaintiffs did not dispute the State’s declaration that married heterosexual
families provide children with a more stable home environment, proper gender
identification, and less social stigmatization than homosexual homes.220 The
Southern District Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden to
negate the reasons offered by defendants to justify the homosexual adoption
211. See Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988).
212. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1382; see also F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
314 (1993).
213. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (discussing judiciary’s normal
role in determining whether exercised power is for a public purpose).
216. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1383.
217. See F.A.C. 65C-16.005(6)(f)(1).
218. See generally 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
219. See Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315; United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
220. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
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provision, nor did they raise a material issue of fact with respect to defendants
purported legitimate interest, and, therefore, the interest must be found valid.221
Ultimately, the Lofton decision upheld the constitutionality of the homosexual
adoption provision.222 The Lofton case is being appealed to the 11th Circuit
Court of Appeals, where the issue of gay adoption will be heard by a federal
appellate court for the first time ever. If the 11th Circuit upholds the ruling by
the Southern District of Florida and the United States Supreme Court grants
certiorari, the Supreme Court will have to consider the constitutionality of this
holding. In all hope, the Supreme Court will reverse the Lofton decision in
light of the following considerations.
VI. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
A.

Misuse of the Best Interest of the Child Standard

It appears as though the decision in Lofton v. Kearney223 is principally
fancy footwork by the court used to uphold discrimination against
homosexuals as constitutional. Taking a closer look, it seems as though the
best interest of the child standard, that was offered as the “legitimate purpose”
behind the per se denial of homosexual adoption, is merely a guise for
discrimination.224 Florida argued two legitimate purposes in Lofton. The first
argument is a public morality argument, while the second is the exact same
argument under the pretext of the BIOC.225
“Homosexuality has been long disfavored in the law based on beliefs
firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards for a
millennia.”226 As the court correctly claims in regards to this purported
rationale, “enacting a classification to express society’s disapproval of a group
burdened by the law is precisely what the Equal Protection Clause does not
allow.”227 The court denied Lofton the right to adopt a child based on the
BIOC.228 This use of the BIOC changes the very purpose for the standard, the
child’s best interest.
As mentioned earlier, the BIOC, when properly applied, has many factors
that a court is supposed to consider and weigh in determining what is best for a

221. Id.
222. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
223. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (2001).
224. See Russman, supra note 1. See generally Langemak, supra note 5.
225. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating the reasons for finding that placement
with homosexual parents is against the child’s best interest are grounded in morality).
226. See O’Toole, supra note 4, at 130; Boswell, supra note 27.
227. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
228. Id.
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child awaiting adoption.229 Both Lofton and Houghton were found to be
acceptable parents outside of their homosexuality. Essentially, the court made
homosexuality the only relevant consideration and ignored all the other factors
contributing to the BIOC. One factor that the Florida Supreme Court failed to
consider is the home environment of the parents. Lofton’s home environment
was worthy of receiving the Outstanding Foster Parenting award from a child
placement agency.230 Likewise, the child placement evaluator told Houghton
on the home study evaluation that he would have received a favorable review
for the home study if not for his homosexuality.231
Another factor that courts are customarily supposed to take into
consideration, in determining what home is in the BIOC, is the time the parent
and child spend together and the quality of the relationship between the parent
and child.232 This point seems to show that it is antagonistic to Doe’s (the
child’s) best interest to not allow Lofton to adopt him.233 Doe and Lofton
spent the entire duration of Doe’s life together as father and son.234 Doe was
placed with Lofton at the time of his birth.235 Over the ten years of Doe’s life
Lofton has been the only parent Doe has had the opportunity to know.236 They
truly have a parent-child relationship; all they need to complete this
relationship is legal recognition.
Courts often look into what physical and emotional support the potential
parent will be able to provide the child.237 Plaintiffs held respectable jobs and
nice homes.238 Lofton had proven his ability to care for Doe by the fact that he
provided him with all the medications Doe needed over a ten-year period.239
Plaintiffs have no criminal records and no reports of sexual offenses.240
Another factor, perhaps one of the most important considerations in child
placement, is the attachment the child feels to the parent.241 Here there is no
doubt that Doe considers Lofton his parent and would not want to leave

229. Bell, supra note 15, at 349 (listing the numerous factors that converge and influence the
BIOC).
230. Id.; see also Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
231. Id.
232. Bell, supra note 15, at 349.
233. Id.; see also Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372.
234. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Bell, supra note 15, at 349.
238. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
239. Id.
240. See id.; Bell, supra note 15 (laying out the factor of criminal background as a
consideration); see also Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250, 254 (Fla. 1996) (regarding criminal
background weighing in the BIOC).
241. Bell, supra note 15.
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Lofton’s care.242 Considering the factors of care, ability, commitment and
attachment it appears as though the Court misapplied the BIOC in allowing
homosexuality to outweigh every other factor combined.243
It is important to note that Doe and Roe are special needs children.244
There are no other parents, couples, or individuals seeking to adopt either of
these children.245 In these cases where the court’s determination is between
authorizing an adoption by a homosexual, who has proved himself a
responsible, loving parent or denying the children a permanent home, the
majority of courts and legislatures would say that the BIOC would mandate
permitting the adoptions. On the other hand, when the situation is one where
one homosexual and one heterosexual have a common child, the factor of the
parent’s sexual orientation must be considered more carefully.246
Homosexuality cannot be ignored in considering potential adoptive
parents.247 It is important to consider the nature of the homosexual relationship
and the affect it will have on the child.248 In Lofton, the state has not claimed
that Lofton’s same-sex relationship has negatively impacted Doe in any way.
In the circumstances of Lofton v. Kearney, there were no other prospective
adoptive parents that made Lofton’s homosexuality a significant factor. Doe
has grown up in a caring loving home with a father figure, but the state refuses
to allow Lofton to be Doe’s legal father. There is no conceivable reason for
the state’s denial to offer this family legal recognition, other than blatant
discrimination and stereotyping.
The BIOC is a blessing as it is the first articulation of a true adoption
principle in today’s society. At the same time it is a curse because it allows
judges to impose their personal morality, biases and social stereotypes with the
force of law.249 It is seen that sometimes judges will deny adoptions to
homosexuals to punish them for their immoral acts.250 In order to understand

242. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375-76.
243. Bell, supra note 15; Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
244. 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
245. Id. at 1372; see also Lin, supra note 1, at 769 (discussing the adoption order and
statistics where of desirable versus undesirable children). Hard to place children occupy most of
the foster care and adoption agencies. Not many two-parent families want to adopt special needs
or older children. Id.
246. Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250, 254 (Fla. 1996).
247. Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children’s Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian:
Toward A Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 854 (1985).
248. Ward, 740 So. 2d at 253 (finding that the lesbian mother could not gain custody not
because of her sexual orientation, but because of the adverse effect it had on her daughter; her
daughter was known to make lewd and inappropriate comments believed to have stemmed from
her mother’s lesbian relationship).
249. Bell, supra note 15, at 349.
250. Id.; see also Lin, supra note 1.
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the decisions coming out of Florida and the different reactions by many state
legislatures, it is essential to realize that “a judge’s understanding about
homosexuality determines to a great extent his or her view on the proper
treatment of [the BIOC standard] under the law.”251 “If a judge lacks accurate
knowledge or relies on assumptions based on prejudices, the child’s best
interests may be sacrificed.”252 This is the only possible explanation for the
holding in Lofton. The nature and characteristics of judges gives them a
perspective where it is difficult for them to see past such traditional factors and
recognize the different cultures and different societal situations that people live
in.
Courts all across the nation have and will continue to uphold statutes and
cases discriminating against homosexuals, simultaneously giving no pause to
allowing other groups of potential adoptive parents such as those with criminal
backgrounds or histories of child abuse to adopt children.253 These criminals
and child abusers face no categorical ban analogous to the bans placed on
homosexuals. In several cases the court has decided that the criminals and
abusers make better homes for children than any and every homosexual, even
an award winning parent such as Lofton.254 By this the courts are declaring
that homosexuality is so severely immoral that children are better off living
without parents or permanent homes and are better off with heterosexual
adults, even ones that may be criminal or abusive.
B.

Homosexuality should not be a per-se ban on adoption rights, rather it
should be only a factor considered in close situations.

Florida has misapplied the BIOC, and many other states have followed
their discriminatory lead. Some states have understood the standard and have
successfully applied it in cases where an adoptive parent is homosexual. The
Arizona court in In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,255 held that
homosexuality could and should be considered; however, it alone should not
make adoption impossible.256 What Arizona was guarding against was a per se
ban on homosexual adoptions like the statute Florida enacted.257 In Pima
County, the majority stated, “[t]he division does determine sexual preference
but there is no policy to recommend or not recommend an applicant solely
because he or she has been identified as a bisexual or homosexual.”258 The
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Bell, supra note 15, at 358.
Id. at 349.
See Ward, 742 So. 2d at 254.
Id.; see also Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
727 P.2d at 840.
Id.
FLA.STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
151 Ariz. at 344.
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courts inquiry into sexuality focuses on promiscuity and flamboyancy in any
situation. The court does not invoke an automatic presumption that
homosexual parents would adversely affect children.259
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed a prior decision taking a child away
from a lesbian mother realizing that there is no suggestion that the mother’s
sexual preference is likely to have a negative affect on the child. “It is
impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to
Mother’s status as a lesbian.”260 A model of a non-discriminatory law that
really protects the best interests of children is set out in a Michigan decision,
People v. Brown.261 This case held the proper rule to be that homosexuality
standing alone without evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the
child does not render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have
custody of the child.262
The Supreme Court of Ohio also applies a standard that does not violate
the constitutional right of homosexuals as seen in the decision of In re
Adoption of Charles B.263 It was held that there was no “per se ban on
homosexual adoptions;” however, if such an adoption were shown to be
harmful to the child, the adoption would not be allowed.264 This is the
intended use of the BIOC.265 This use of the BIOC draws the line not on the
sexual preference of the parents, but instead on the effects the child will
undergo.
The BIOC is very fact specific in its application. Florida’s statute ignores
the facts, making them unimportant. In Lofton, if the court had looked into the
factual situation, they would have seen the reality and not just the language in
their adoption provision. The reality is that both children the plaintiffs wish to
adopt are “special needs” children. The plaintiffs had raised these children
since infancy or youth. No other applications to adopt these children had been
filed. It is not reasonable to believe that someone else will come along to
adopt Doe or Roe as statistics show that special needs children who are past
newborn and young childhood years are very unlikely to find homes.266
Taking this into consideration, how could Florida claim that the denial of
adoption by the only parents Doe and Roe loved and knew was in their best
interest? The real effect of the decision in Lofton is to deny these children the
happy home they dream of, and to deny all of the other children waiting in
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985).
People v. Brown, 212 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
Id.
In re Adoption of Charles B, 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
Id. at 92.
Bell, supra note 15, at 358.
See supra note 1; supra note 191.
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foster care or institutions the possibility that someday they may be taken into a
real home. The effect of the homosexual adoption provision and the court’s
decision has forced the 16,500 children in Florida awaiting homes to be
perpetually stuck in the system, most likely, until they reach the age of
majority or until they slip through the cracks. The only possible rationale for
such a negative outcome on so many children is the fear of and disservice to
homosexuals as a class. This has been a common theme in custody denials for
homosexual parents. The best interest of the child is often overlooked because
of the court’s distraction with the lifestyle of the same-sex couple.267
Statutes and case law that prohibit homosexuals from adopting and even
applying to adopt a child will only force homosexuals to lie about their sexual
orientation. There is evidence that proves that children raised by homosexual
parents are happiest when their parents are at ease about their homosexuality;
therefore, we should not force homosexuals to lie to themselves, their children,
and others so that they can have the opportunity to have a family.268 Such a
result is in no one’s best interest.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not the role of the courts and the legislature to make laws based upon
their approval or disapproval of the relationships seeking legal recognition. As
the times continue to change and the traditional idea of a family evolves, it is
important to realize that the legal definition of a family must change as well.
The law must realize that there are many different family structures that will
provide the love, security, and a stable environment children need.
It is time for courts to recognize that there are hundreds of thousands of
children in foster care, many of which will never be adopted if courts refuse to
accept non-traditional families. By enacting and upholding the homosexual
adoption provision, the Florida Legislature and the District Court of the
Southern District of Florida have forgotten the goals of adoption, and the
BIOC has been misapplied. The result of Lofton is that it is constitutional to
discriminate against homosexuals on the basis of their sexual preference. The
effect, besides preventing homosexuals from forming families, is to trap many
children in a system that cannot give them the love, support, and family
stability they need. This injustice to children is the unnecessary result of the
prevalent societal desire to discriminate against individuals of homosexual
orientation. The holding in Lofton goes so far as to say that children are better
off with no family than a family with a homosexual parent.269 This cannot
possibly be the intention behind the BIOC.
267. Bell, supra note 15, at 360.
268. SCHULENBURG, supra note 56, at 99.
269. See generally Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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